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Incentives and Nudges for Environmental Stewardship on Farmland:  
A Lab Experiment on the Agglomeration Bonus 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes have an 
important role in generating ecosystem services conser-
vation and restoration benefits through adoption of var-
ious land uses on private agricultural property. These 
policies provide financial compensation to producers 
for benefits delivered over and above a baseline level 
and for any income losses arising from the land use 
change (Hanley et al. 2012). Examples of PES schemes 
include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the 
U. S., the Pago por Servicios Ambientales in Costa Rica 
and the Stewardship Schemes in the  U. K. to name a 
few.  
In this research, I study an economic incentive called 
the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) (Parkhurst et al. 2002) 
which can be employed under a PES scheme to enroll 
spatially contiguous land parcels or those within a given 
distance of each other under similar land uses. Spatial 
coordination of land uses is an important objective be-
cause many ecosystem services have strict spatial re-
quirements. For example, biodiversity conservation 
may involve creation of critical minimum sized reserves 
on adjacent private properties and corridors linking 
publicly owned core habitat acres that might require 
land use coordination of neighboring producers falling 
along the corridor path (Albers et al. 2016). Similarly 
water quality improvements can be realized through 
spatially coordinated riparian buffer creation.  (Lane et 
al. 2006).  
The AB constitutes a two-part subsidy with a participa-
tion component and a bonus payable to neighboring 
producers when they coordinate their land uses. This 
structure produces a coordination game between neigh-
boring producers with multiple Nash equilibria one of 
which is payoff efficient and the other(s) payoff ineffi-
cient. Both the general and the AB focused game theo-
retic literature has focused on mechanisms which can  
lead to the payoff efficient equilibrium outcome and 
avoid coordination failure.  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  12-1-17 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  114.00  125.00  118.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  147.13  181.22  177.43 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  135.02  171.89  154.80 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  189.55  206.83  207.08 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  47.83  60.85  59.20 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73.11  78.39  82.66 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  141.90  142.22  134.53 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  352.34  381.23  388.43 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.64  3.23  3.26 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  3.09  3.13  3.12 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.53  8.92  9.10 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.79  5.59  5.51 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.85  2.99  2.74 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  NA  157.50  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67.50  82.50  87.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  65.00  82.50  82.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  107.50  125.50  144.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.00  42.00  44.00 
 ⃰  No Market          
.  In this research, I study a monetary and non-monetary 
mechanism in promoting spatial coordination on the effi-
cient strategy by neighboring producers and improving the 
capacity of the AB to achieve coordinated land uses on agri-
cultural landscapes. The monetary mechanism varies the 
financial rewards associated with efficient coordination in 
different ways and the non-monetary one involves provid-
ing participants with information about others’ choices. 
This information has no strategic value and is so is a pure 
nudge.  
I investigate the effectiveness of these two mechanisms with 
the help of human subject economic experiments. This 
methodology is appropriate because it allows low-cost con-
trolled testing of the AB policy under different conditions 
and provides a proof-of-concept before field testing with 
producers (Schram 2005). Additionally, implementation of 
both mechanisms might require changing legislation and 
extra funds both of which will generate costs to society 
which legislators may be willing to incur/consider only after 
obtaining scientific evidence about the impacts/efficacy of 
these mechanisms.  
Experimental Design:  
I collected data on 144 student subjects recruited from the 
undergraduate student population of University of Nebras-
ka-Lincoln. These subjects were randomly distributed be-
tween six baseline sessions denoted by OWN-INFO and six 
treatment sessions termed OWN-OTHER-INFO. The 
OWN-INFO sessions consisted of one group of eight peo-
ple (total 48 subjects) and the OWN-OTHER-INFO ses-
sions (remaining 96 subjects), comprised of two eight-
person groups with participants randomly assigned to each 
group. Table 1 presents the experimental design. During 
the experiment each group of eight subjects were arranged 
around a circular network and played an AB game with 
their two neighbors to the left and right. The game consist-
ed of a choice between two strategies T and C with T being 
the payoff efficient strategy on which coordination is both 
economically and environmentally desirable.  
The monetary payoff variation treatment was imple-
mented as a within-subject treatment with three differ-
ent AB payment magnitudes presented to subjects in a 
payoff table. Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c present the different 
payment scenarios under which all subjects made deci-
sions. Next, the experiment moved to the information-
nudge treatment which was implemented in a between-
subject format. Groups in the OWN-INFO condition 
received information about members of their own 
group only. In the OWN-OTHER-INFO condition, in 
addition to receiving own-group information, subjects 
received information about a partner group (and vice-
versa). For this stage, subjects faced a new AB game 
table presented in Table 3.  During this stage, subjects 
repeatedly interacted with each other for 30 periods. 
Finally, subjects participated in an incentivized Holt-
Laury (2002) risk preference elicitation lottery and a 
brief survey after which they were paid in cash. Average 
earnings across both treatments was about $22. 
Experimental Results:  
Table 4 presents the average value of T choices and lev-
el of coordination on T choices (measured as number 
of triplets of neighbors choosing T) in the network for 
each payment scenario. Non-parametric McNamar 
tests comparing outcomes across scenarios indicates 
that rates of T choice and coordination on T are signifi-
cantly higher in Scenarios II and III compared to that 
in Scenario I. This finding is not surprising if we con-
sider the fact that unlike in Tables 2b and 2c, in Table 
2a, the payoff from choosing T when no one else does is 
0. Thus, action T has more payoff risk in this setting 
and this reduces subjects’ likelihood of making this 
choice. Interestingly, levels of coordination are positive 
in all scenarios meaning that in its current form the AB 
can economically incentivize spatially coordinated land 
use although the degree depends upon the magnitude 
of payments.  
   Payoff Variation Treatment 
Information Treatment 
(Between-Subjects Treat-
ment in  Stage 2) 
Payoff Order 1  Payoff Order 2  Payoff Order 3 
OWN-INFO 
 2 1-group sessions 
(8 subjects per ses-
sion) 
2 1-group sessions 
(8 subjects per session) 
 2 1-group sessions 
(8 subjects per session) 
OWN-OTHER-INFO   2 2-group sessions (16 subjects per ses-
 2 2-group sessions 
(16 subjects per ses-
2 2-group sessions 
(16 subjects per session) 
Table 1: Experimental Design 
Table 2a: Scenario I 
Table 2b: Scenario II 
Table 2c: Scenario III 
Table 3: Payoff Table for Information-Nudge Treatment 
Monetary Incentive Scenarios  Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III 
Average T Choices  0.65 (0.47) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
Average T Coordination  0.28 (0.45) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.49 
(0.5) 
Table 4: Average values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of T Choices and Coordina-
tion  on T for Monetary Treatment 
   
   Neighbors’ Choices 
Your Choice  Both Choose T  One Chooses T & Other C  Both Choose C 
Choose T  70  35  0 
Choose C  40  50  60 
   
   Neighbors’ Choices 
Your Choice  Both Choose T  One Chooses T & Other C  Both Choose C 
Choose T  70  45  20 
Choose C  40  50  60 
   
   Neighbors’ Choices 
Your Choice  Both Choose T  One Chooses T & Other C  Both Choose C 
Choose T  85  45  5 
Choose C  40  50  60 
  Neighbor's Choices 
Your Choice Both Choose T One Chooses T & Other C Booth Choose C 
Choose T 90 50 10 
Choose C 60 70 80 
Next, I provide an analysis of the impact of the information 
nudge on the likelihood of choosing T and improving coor-
dination rates. Table 5 summarizes data from all periods 
and sessions and indicates that the number of T choices and 
T coordination rates is higher on average in the  OWN- 
OTHER-INFO sessions than in the OWN-INFO ones. 
Additionally, Figures 1 and 2 present the average out-
comes for every period across all sessions. I highlight 
two key findings. 
Treatment Condition/Group  Average T Choices  Average T Coordination 
OWN-INFO  0.58 (0.49) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
OWN- 
OTHER-INFO 
0.79 
(0.4) 
0.7 
(0.46) 
Table 5. Average values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of T Choices and Coordination for In-
formation-Nudge Treatment  * 
Figure 1: Proportion of T Choices by Information Treatment 
Figure 2: Proportion of T Coordination by Information Treatment 
past history of interaction are randomly assigned to a 
treatment. Field experiments with producers whose utili-
ty depends upon their own actions and the actions and 
opinions of neighbors and non-neighboring community 
members with whom they have repeatedly interacted for 
many time periods will be essential for understanding 
the effect of the two mechanisms I study. The combina-
tion of lab and field evidence is essential for making the 
case for implementing PES schemes with an AB format. 
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First in Period 1, when subjects have not received any in-
formation feedback about others choices, there is no in-
formation treatment effect. Second, figure 2 indicates that 
barring the first few periods, average coordination rates of 
the OWN-OTHER-INFO groups always remains above 
50%.  Moreover, there is no significant time trend suggest-
ing that repeated interactions may be reinforcing players’ 
propensity to continuously choose T given partner group 
information. That subjects were paying attention to part-
ner group information is evident from the fact that on a 
scale of 0 to 10, the median response for the survey ques-
tion asking subjects in the OWN-OTHER-INFO condi-
tion whether they paid attention to partner-group infor-
mation was 8. Finally, I conducted random-effects logistic 
regression analysis which presented that outcomes are 
significantly different in the presence of the information-
nudge in addition to being impacted by a subject’s and 
their neighbors’ previous actions. Thus, the key result is 
that the information nudge is beneficial for incentivizing 
spatially coordinated land use actions on the network.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study provides scientific evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of the monetary incentive variation and in-
formation nudge treatment in incentivizing spatially coor-
dinated land use choice across neighboring properties. 
Both mechanisms are attractive but involve tradeoffs. 
Higher payoffs will appeal to producers but may not be 
permissible owing to policy budget constraints.  
Herein, providing information about land use choices of 
other producers is appealing as it is an affordable strategy 
for the regulator. This is because the regulator already has 
that information from past signups which they might be 
able to disseminate to producers at relatively low costs to 
society. Yet, the manner in which producers will respond 
to the regulator sharing this information is unclear. This 
suggests the importance of focus groups and one-on-one 
interactions to assess producers’ acceptance of the infor-
mation nudge mechanism. The results of this study, how-
ever, provide some key insights about the type of behavior 
and policy outcomes to be expected.  Of course, the find-
ings are an artifact of the experimental design which is a 
stylized representation of interactions between actual pro-
ducers. While it provides proof-of-concept, results may be 
different under different conditions and hence is worthy 
of more experimentation.  
Finally, it is important to conduct AB focused field experi-
ments to establish external validity of the current findings 
rather than extrapolating the findings from the lab to the 
field. In the real world, the idea of own and other/partner 
community is quite different from that considered in this 
experiment where groups of eight people without any  
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